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A B S T R A C T   
Currently, Indonesia has only three nuclear research reactors. However, Indonesia is the world’s fourth most 
populous country. Owing to the enormous size and rapid growth of the population and the limited availability of 
fossil fuel and renewable energy resources, the construction of new nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been 
considered. Because of this, the management policies for long-term spent nuclear fuel in Indonesia have become 
crucial. This paper reviews the current handling and future management strategies for spent nuclear fuel in 
Indonesia. With a maximum capacity of 1448 spent fuel elements, Indonesia’s interim wet storage of spent fuel 
(ISSF) is designed to store spent nuclear fuel arising from 25 years of reactor operation at maximum power. 
However, with the existing low-power reactor operation, the ISSF could be utilized for more than 75 years. The 
potential problem for long-term storage in the ISSF is system, structure, and component (SSC) aging. Continuous 
planning, operation, monitoring, and maintenance of the SSC in the ISSF have been conducted to ensure safe 
long-term utilization of the facility. In accordance with the possibility of NPP construction in the future, three 
possible scenarios may be considered for future nuclear spent fuel management strategies in Indonesia: 1) wet 
storage - dry storage - disposal; 2) wet storage -repatriation or sending to other countries; and 3) wet storage - 
moving to wet- or dry storage of NPP candidate - disposal.   
1. Introduction 
Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country. According to 
the Intercensal Population Survey, the population of Indonesia was 
264.2 million in 2015, and based on the projection data from Indonesia’s 
Central Agency on Statistics, this figure is estimated to reach more than 
319.0 million by 2045 [1], as shown in Fig. 1. 
In 2019, Indonesia’s government targeted an economic growth of 
5.3% and assumed a range of 5.3–5.5% [2–5]. According to a collabo-
rative study conducted by the National Development Planning Ministry 
and the Asian Development Bank, the potential economic growth in the 
next five years is 5.7% [6]. Given the economic growth and total pop-
ulation mentioned above, to meet the country’s long-term energy needs, 
Presidential Decree No. 05 of 2006, which was revised and developed 
into Government Regulation No. 79 of 2014, set a target of generating 
115 GWe of electrical energy in 2025. This means that it is necessary to 
build power plants generating a total power of 6.2 GWe/year [7,8]. 
The National Energy Policy in Presidential Decree No. 05 of 2006 
stated that the share of oil in the primary energy mix in 2025 should be 
less than 20%. The total percentage of new and renewable energy 
planned should be more than 15%. The new and renewable energy 
consists of 2% hydro, 5% geothermal, and 8% other energy sources, 
which includes 2% nuclear energy [7]. 
Currently, fossil sources supply 85% of Indonesia’s total energy 
needs. Oil production continues to decline, and Indonesia has been a 
crude oil importer since 2004. Coal production is only 3.1% of the total 
world production, and most of the produced coal is exported to increase 
the country’s foreign exchange. If new reserves are not found, it is 
estimated that this energy source will be exhausted within a few decades 
[9]. With an annual population increase of 1.1% and an annual eco-
nomic growth averaging 5%, alternative sources of base-load energy 
must be sought to support this change. On the other hand, according to 
the COP21 agreement, Indonesia has committed to achieving a 29% 
reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 [10]. Therefore, the only 
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remaining option is to consider nuclear energy [11]. With the afore-
mentioned considerations, along with the limited availability of fossil 
and renewable energy resources and policies regarding the reduction of 
carbon emissions [12–15], nuclear power plants (NPPs) are urgently 
needed in Indonesia. Currently, Indonesia does not have an NPP; how-
ever, there are three nuclear research reactors for radioisotope pro-
duction and research purposes. 
The results of a public opinion poll on the Indonesian NPP program 
in the 2015–2017 period indicated that more than 70% of the re-
spondents supported the NPP program. However, the public expressed 
concern about accidents and the handling of the radioactive waste 
produced [16]. This paper presents a review of the policy, strategy, and 
current status of spent fuel management in Indonesia with an additional 
review on international approaches used for spent nuclear fuel man-
agement and practices. The discussion on spent fuel management in 
Indonesia applies not only to the existing spent fuel arising from nuclear 
research reactors but also from an NPP that currently does not exist in 
Indonesia but is planned. Some potential problems that may be 
encountered in spent nuclear fuel management and future strategies for 
spent nuclear management in Indonesia are also discussed. 
2. International approaches for spent nuclear fuel management 
Radioactive waste must be managed safely to ensure that it will not 
endanger human health and the environment. According to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, radioactive 
waste must be stored in such a manner that it can be monitored, 
inspected, retrieved, and preserved in a condition suitable for subse-
quent management [17]. Several studies have been conducted on the 
management of radioactive sources or waste. The management process 
involves treatment, storage, and disposal [18–21]. 
One of the most dangerous radioactive wastes is spent nuclear fuel, 
which has a very high radioactivity and long half-life. Spent nuclear fuel 
is generated from the operation of NPPs and nuclear research reactors. 
After being discharged from the reactor, the spent nuclear fuel can be 
stored in wet or dry conditions. During wet storage, the spent fuel is kept 
in storage racks, which are placed in a water pool. The water in the pool 
serves as a cooling medium as well as radiation protection. 
Generally, there are several options for spent nuclear fuel manage-
ment [22–25]:  
• Directly dispose of the spent fuel in a national geological repository 
(final disposal facility).  
• Reprocess the spent fuel.  
• Return the spent fuel to the origin country/supplier.  
• Follow a “wait and see” policy; this means keeping the spent fuel in 
an interim wet or dry storage and waiting for the correct time to 
make a final decision. 
The storage or management of spent fuel should meet the safety 
standards of the IAEA. The IAEA Safety Standard Series (SSG-15) pro-
vides guidance and recommendations on the safe design (containment, 
criticality, heat removal, radiation shielding, retrievability, and trans-
portability) and safe operation (criticality, heat removal, radiation 
shielding, and handling) of spent fuel facilities. SSG-15 can be applied to 
spent fuel from NPPs and nuclear research reactors [17,26–28]. 
2.1. Management options for spent fuel from nuclear power plants in 
select countries 
The need for the management of spent fuel from NPPs is apparent, 
and the technology used for this purpose is more advanced. However, 
the absence of spent fuel disposal facilities compromises the credibility 
of the nuclear community and reduces public acceptance of current and 
future nuclear programs. Some people believe that it is unethical, irre-
sponsible, and ultimately not sustainable to defer problems to future 
generations. 
As stated above, there are several options for the management of 
spent nuclear fuel from NPPs. Different countries choose an appropriate 
option or options according to different circumstances. Currently, no 
deep geological repository or final disposal facility for spent fuel or high- 
level radioactive waste (HLW) is in operation, although research on this 
topic has been conducted using a range of underground laboratories for 
several decades [24]. Countries that have chosen a direct disposal policy 
include Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the UK 
[24,29–38]. 
A reprocessing policy (reprocessing nuclear fuel and recycling the 
separated material) is followed by China, France, India, Japan, Russia, 
Fig. 1. Indonesia population projection.  
Table 1 
Current management options being considered for nuclear research reactor 




Direct disposal Netherland [57] 
Reprocessing UK [58] 
Repatriation Argentina [59], Australia [60], Brazil [59], Chile [59], Czech 
[61], Indonesia [62], Italy [63], Kazakhstan [64], and Ukraine 
[65] 
Wait and see Australia [60], Canada [66], Czech [61], Finland [67], Germany 
[68], Hungary [69], India [70], Indonesia [62], South Korea 
[71], Netherland [57], Norway [72], Poland ] [73], Ukraine 
[65], US [74], and Uzbekistan [75]  
a Some countries may follow more than one management policy. 
Table 2 
Summarized data of the nuclear research reactors in Indonesia.  












1987 30 MW 
TRIGA 2000 Bandung TRIGA 1964 250 kW 
1000 kW (1. 
Upgrade in 
1972) 
2000 kW (2. 
Upgrade in 
2000) 
Kartini Yogyakarta TRIGA 1979 100 kW  
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the UK, and USA [12,24,29,38–48]. 
One policy on spent fuel management that is reasonably favorable for 
some countries is the repatriation of the spent fuel to its origin country. 
The countries that export their spent nuclear fuel are Belgium (export to 
France), Bulgaria (export to Russia), Italy (export to France), the 
Netherlands (export to France), and Ukraine (export to Russia) [29,49]. 
However, most contracts between reprocessing countries and countries 
that use the nuclear fuel require the waste to be returned to its original 
state. China, in their NPP promotion, may offer to finance, build, 
operate, supply fuel, and retrieve spent nuclear fuel from exported re-
actors [50]. 
The management option that is currently widely used is the place-
ment of spent fuel in interim wet or dry storage while awaiting a further 
policy. This “wait and see” policy is practiced by Argentina, Armenia, 
Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, the USA, and all countries that have 
chosen the direct disposal option (as there are currently no operating 
disposal sites) [29,48,51–56]. 
2.2. Management options for spent nuclear fuel from nuclear research 
reactors in some countries 
The spent nuclear fuel from research reactors usually has a smaller 
dimension than that of fuel from NPPs; however, as described above, the 
spent nuclear fuel management options for research reactors are similar 
to those for NPPs. Some countries, such as Indonesia, do not have NPPs 
but do have nuclear research reactors. In the same manner as for NPPs, it 
is possible to choose more than one option for management of spent 
nuclear fuel from research reactors. Although the amount of spent nu-
clear fuel is considerably less than that from NPPs, complex issues are 
also encountered during the handling of spent nuclear fuel from research 
reactors. Economic factors tend to cause the spent nuclear fuel from 
research reactors to be stored for the long term. Cooperative regional 
networks and frameworks for spent fuel storage and disposal may be a 
productive method of addressing this problem. 
A summary of the current management options being considered by 
several countries for managing spent fuel from their nuclear research 
reactors is presented in Table 1. However, it should be noted that under 
certain circumstances, the management policies shown in Table 1 might 
change over time. 
3. Current status of spent nuclear fuel management in Indonesia 
3.1. Research reactors in Indonesia 
As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has three nuclear research reactors 
but does not currently have an NPP. The research reactors are a 30-MW 
material testing reactor (MTR) at Serpong, a 2-MW training, research, 
isotopes, and general atomics (TRIGA)-type reactor at Bandung, and a 
100-kW TRIGA-type reactor at Yogyakarta. The maximum fuel burnups 
of the Serpong reactor, Bandung research reactor, and Yogyakarta 
research reactor are 59%, 50%, and 10%, respectively. 
Fig. 2. Locations of nuclear research reactors in Indonesia.  
Fig. 3. MTR nuclear fuel from the RSG-GAS research reactor.  
Table 3 
Specifications of the RSG-GAS fuel element.  
Specification Value 
Dimension (mm) 77.1 × 81 x 600 
No. of plates per standard fuel element (FE) 21 
No. of plates per control element (CE) 15 
Clad material AlMg2 
Clad thickness (mm) 0.38 
Meat dimension (mm) 0.54 × 62.75 x 600 
Meat material U3Si2Al 
235U Enrichment (w/o) 19.75% 
U3Si2Al density (g/cm3) 2.96 
235U weight per FE (g) 250 
235U weight per CE (g) 178.6  
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The summarized data and the location of the research reactors are 
shown in Table 2 and Fig. 2. 
The spent fuel or nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in these 
Fig. 4. Connections between the ISSF and Serpong research reactor, Radioisotopes Installation, and Radio Metallurgical Installation.  
Fig. 5. Serpong ISSF layout.  
Fig. 6. Spent fuel pool in the Serpong ISSF.  
Table 4 




To treat the pool and transfer channel water to maintain its 




To replace water lost through evaporation under normal 
conditions. To wash the resin beds when they need 
replacing. 
Pool cooling system To remove heat arising in the pool from the spent fuel and 
maintain the water at 35 ◦C by chilled water. 
Ventilation system To provide a satisfactory working environment for the 
operators and to minimize the spread of any airborne 
contamination and, in particular, its release to the 
environment. 
Fuel transfer system To transfer spent fuel from the reactor to the ISSF and to 
handle the spent fuel at the ISSF building. 
Make-up water system To supply pool water as compensation for the water lost by 
evaporation or leakage. 
Radiation monitoring 
system 
To measure radiation dose rates and airborne 
radionuclides. Continuously operated with local alarm 
and unambiguous readouts. To detect contamination of 
workers.  
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research reactors must be handled, stored, and managed in a safe, 
responsible, and effective manner. Several studies have been conducted 
on Indonesia’s spent fuel storage safety [76–80]. 
The policy on the management of spent nuclear fuel in Indonesia 
(through the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN)) is to not recycle 
the spent nuclear fuel. Government Regulation No. 27/2002 on Radio-
active Waste Management states that spent nuclear fuel is not allowed to 
be reprocessed. The spent nuclear fuel should be directly disposed or 
stored temporarily by waste producers/BATAN and then returned to the 
origin or supplier country [81]. 
A part of the spent nuclear fuel from the three Indonesian research 
reactors (Serpong, Bandung, and Yogyakarta) was sent to the supplier 
country. The first spent nuclear fuel repatriation to the US, which 
included 47 spent nuclear fuel elements from the Serpong research 
reactor, was performed in 1999, [85]. In 2004, 111 spent nuclear fuel 
elements from the Bandung research reactor, 71 elements from the 
Yogyakarta research reactor, and 111 elements from the Serpong 
research reactor were shipped to the US [84]. In 2009, 42 spent nuclear 
fuel elements from the research reactor in Serpong were sent to the 
Savannah River Site (SRS) in the US [82,83]. 
Since 2001, most of the uranium in the Serpong reactor has been 
obtained from France and Russia, with whom there is no contractual 
agreement for spent nuclear fuel repatriation [86]. 
3.2. Interim storage of spent fuel 
A building for the interim storage of spent fuel (ISSF), which is 
located in Serpong, has been in operation since 1998. The ISSF was 
designed to store the spent nuclear fuel in a water pool (wet storage). 
Currently, the entirety of the spent fuel at the ISSF comes from the RSG- 
GAS in Serpong, while the spent fuel from the Yogyakarta and Bandung 
research reactors is still stored in a pond near each reactor. 
The RSG-GAS fuel elements are of the low-enriched uranium-mate-
rial testing reactor (LEU-MTR) type, as seen in Fig. 3. The detailed 
specifications of the RSG-GAS fuel elements are listed in Table 3 [62]. 
In the current practice, the fresh spent nuclear fuel, or spent fuel that 
has just been removed from the RSG-GAS research reactor, will be stored 
temporarily in a reactor cooling pond, which has a maximum capacity of 
288 spent fuel elements, near the reactor core for 100 days or more [62]. 
Then, the spent nuclear fuel must be transferred to the ISSF through the 
transfer channels containing water and stored in a rack at the bottom of 
an ISSF pool. 
The transfer channel is also used to transfer the irradiated targets 
from the reactors to the Radioisotope Installation (RI) facility and to 
transfer the spent fuel from the reactor to the Radio Metallurgy Instal-
lation (RMI) and from the RMI facility to the ISSF, as depicted in Fig. 4. 
The ISSF pool has a 14-m length, 5-m width, and 7.6-m depth. It was 
designed by AEA Technology, UK, with a multi-barrier construction (SS- 
304 liner, walls, mild steel, and concrete). The ISSF layout and spent fuel 
pool inside the ISSF are shown in Figs. 5 and 6 [87,88]. 
The ISSF in Serpong has several main systems, as shown in Table 4. 
The water treatment system, or water purification process, is oper-
ated continuously through an ion-exchange column to maintain the 
water quality (chemistry, clarity, and radioactive content) at acceptable 
levels, as shown in Table 5. 
The demineralized ISSF pool water serves as a pool-cooling system 
and as radiation shielding for the spent fuel stored in the pool. The ISSF 
cooling system is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the 
spent fuel through water circulation to maintain the water temperature 
in the pool at less than 35 ◦C. 
The ventilation and air-conditioning system maintains the facility 
Table 5 




Conductivity <15 μS/cm 
Pool water level 6.5 m 
Pool water temperature <35 ◦C 
Air contamination <70 Bq/m3 
Room temperature <30 ◦C 
Dose rate in the pool <0.025 mSv/h  
Fig. 7. HMI-screen for the cooling system for the pool in RSG-GAS.  
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building temperature of 20–25 ◦C, relative humidity of 40–60%, room 
negative pressure of 100 ± 25 Pa, and radiation exposure of 0.02–0.05 
mSv/h, through air renewals five times per hour [89–91]. 
The ISSF in RSG-GAS uses a control system in its operation. The RSG- 
GAS system control serves some systems via a remote I/O programmable 
logic controller (PLC) and human machine interface (HMI). The 
controllable systems in RSG-GAS are the purification system, deminer-
alization system, ventilation and air conditioning (VAC) system, cooling 
system, and room-monitoring system. From the HMI screen, the systems 
in RSG-GAS can be monitored and controlled remotely. The HMI screen 
is shown in Fig. 7. 
3.3. Current spent fuel management 
The ISSF facility in Serpong is designed to accommodate spent nu-
clear fuel arising from 25 years of reactor operation at maximum power. 
By a maximum RSG-GAS reactor operation design of 30 MW, the nuclear 
fuel elements are replaced seven times per year (seven replacement 
cycles). In each cycle, eight nuclear fuel elements are replaced. For 25 
years of reactor operation, the total number of spent fuel elements will 
be 1400. The storage capacity of the ISSF is 1448 spent nuclear ele-
ments, including the spent element control rod. However, in the current 
practice, the RSG-GAS reactor has not been operating at maximum 
power. There are only six nuclear fuel element replacements per cycle 
and only three cycles per year. Under these conditions, with a maximum 
capacity of 1448 spent nuclear fuel elements, the ISSF could be utilized 
for 80 years of RSG-GAS operation. 
From when the RSG-GAS reactor first began operating, in 1987, to 
2020, the number of spent nuclear fuel elements that are stored in the 
ISSF pool was only 287, including 244 spent fuel elements and 43 
control rod elements. As mentioned above, in accordance with the policy 
that all spent nuclear fuel from the US must be sent back to its home 
country, 198 spent nuclear fuel elements have been sent back to their 
country of origin. 
4. Potential problems in spent nuclear fuel management in 
Indonesia 
When the research reactors were established in Serpong, Bandung, 
and Yogyakarta a few decades ago, these locations were far from densely 
populated settlements. However, in the last ten years, community 
housing has developed at sites around the nuclear facilities. Thus, there 
are fears of public safety risks, and there is increasing pressure to find 
various options for handling radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel 
[92]. 
Another potential problem that may be encountered during long- 
term storage in the ISSF is system, structure, and component (SSC) 
aging. Aging is a gradual process that is a function of time or utilization, 
Fig. 8. PDCA cycle of aging management program in the ISSF.  
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in which the characteristics or properties of the SSC degrade. Because 
aging can affect the general safety conditions of the ISSF facility, an 
aging management program (AMP) is needed to overcome this issue. 
The AMP activities include planning, operation, monitoring, and 
maintenance to control and maintain the effects of aging on the SSC 
within acceptable limits. Fig. 8 presents the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) 
cycle of the AMP implemented at the ISSF. 
The type of degradation of the material, structure, or system at the 
ISSF that needs to be monitored continuously is corrosion. One of the 
most critical components of the ISSF in terms of the corrosion risk is the 
liner. The liner is 304 stainless steel and lines the entire wall and bottom 
surface of the spent fuel pool. This liner serves to prevent pool leakage 
and also acts as a neutron absorbent; hence, it can provide more security 
in terms of criticality safety. Criticality is a nuclear chain reaction that 
can continue by itself which refers to the balance of neutrons in the 
system. Whereas, criticality safety refers to the prevention of accidents 
resulting from self-sustained nuclear chain reactions and the minimi-
zation of the consequences of such accidents if they do occur [93]. 
There have been several assessments and studies related to safety 
parameters such as material, component, and system aging; criticality 
safety; pool water chemistry surveillance; and corrosion management at 
the ISSF [86,94–96]. In the ISSF, several corrosion test coupons were 
prepared and positioned in the service pool. The test coupons for the fuel 
cladding were fabricated using an aluminum alloy (same as the material 
used for the fuel cladding) and stainless steel (same as the material used 
for the liner and the spent fuel storage rack). The analysis result of the 
test coupons indicated the following [86,94]:  
• The water quality in the spent fuel pool meets the relevant standard: 
the pH values were between 5.5 and 7.7, the conductivity was be-
tween 1.33 and 1.50 μS/cm (much smaller than maximum allowable 
value of 15 μS/cm).  
• The corrosion rate of the 304 stainless steel liner was 5.08. 10− 5 mm 
per year. This means that the liner can be utilized for more than 40 
years.  
• The corrosion of the stainless steel and aluminum alloy of the test 
coupons mainly involved galvanic and crevice effects, as can be seen 
in Figs. 9 and 10. In addition, based on the microscope observation, 
there was no pitting, and no biofilm was present either. Changes in 
the physical appearance of the coupon surface after one and three 
years are due to the scaling process derived from the pool water. 
Controlling the quantity of aggressive ions, such as chloride, is also 
necessary to maximize the margin of the safety material and to avoid 
Fig. 9. Galvanic corrosion between SS and AlMg2 at various exposure times up to 3 years.  
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Fig. 10. Crevice corrosion between AlMg2 and AlMg2 at various exposure times up to 3 years.  
Fig. 11. ISSF utilization prediction.  
Fig. 12. Scenarios for spent fuel management in Indonesia.  
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premature damage to the material. In general, well-organized manage-
ment of water temperature, activity level, water chemistry, and corro-
sion products is necessary to ensure safety in long-term storage. 
Another potential problem is the spent fuel storage capacity in the 
future. However, in RSG-GAS, with the large pool capacity and the low 
existing discharge rate of spent fuel, the spent fuel pool can be operated 
for the next 60 years, as discussed in Section 5. 
5. Future prediction and strategies for spent nuclear fuel 
management in Indonesia 
As of 2020, due to repatriation and the low power of the RSG-GAS 
operation, the number of spent nuclear fuel elements in the ISSF pool 
was only 287. As explained earlier, at the maximum RSG-GAS power of 
30 MW, the number of nuclear fuel elements replaced is eight per cycle, 
and seven replacement cycles are performed per year. However, in 
practice, there have been only six fuel element substitutions with three 
cycles per year. Fig. 11 shows that if the maximum RSG-GAS design had 
been used, the ISSF pool would have reached its maximum capacity in 
2013 (25 years after the first operation in 1987). However, with the 
existing operation, the ISSF pool could be utilized until 2079, more than 
80 years after RSG-GAS first started operating. Fig. 11 also shows the 
spent fuel repatriations to the US in 1999, 2004, and 2009. 
Several studies have proposed that the Bandung TRIGA reactor’s 
nuclear fuel should be converted from the TRIGA cylindrical fuel 
element to the MTR plate fuel element [97,98]. Because of the limited 
amount of existing nuclear fuel and the fact that the TRIGA fuel is 
currently no longer being produced, in 2026, the fuel in the Bandung 
reactor will be replaced. With 2 MW of thermal power, after the con-
version, Bandung’s reactor will produce four spent fuel elements and 
one spent control rod every 2.34 years. This additional spent fuel from 
Bandung, which will be sent to and stored at ISSF Serpong, will reduce 
the time required until the ISSF reaches its maximum capacity. The 
maximum capacity of the ISSF will be reached in 2074 (5 years earlier 
than 2079), as shown in Fig. 11. 
To ensure that the ISSF installation operates properly over a long 
period, the potential degradation of materials caused by factors such as 
corrosion and water chemistry needs to be monitored and conditioned to 
ensure that the spent fuel wet storage remains in a safe condition. 
Controlling the quantity of aggressive ions, such as chloride, is also 
necessary to maximize the margin of safety and to avoid premature 
damage to the material. In general, well-organized management of 
water temperature, activity level, water chemistry, and corrosion 
products is necessary to ensure safe long-term storage. 
Generally, for long-term spent-fuel management in Indonesia, 
several scenarios or strategies can be implemented, as presented in 
Fig. 12. The yellow arrows indicate the repatriation policy of spent fuel 
to the origin country that has previously been followed (1999, 2004, and 
2009). 
The management strategy currently used in Indonesia is to store the 
spent fuel for a specified period in wet storage, while the next man-
agement policy is being formulated (wait-and-see policy). When the 
final spent fuel policy to be followed is implemented, it can be assumed 
that the waiting time until a disposal site is ready for use would be de-
cades, as no HLW disposal site currently exists, and considering the high 
cost and complexity of disposal procurement. However, considering the 
existing operations of the RSG-GAS and future Bandung reactor, the 
maximum capacity of the ISSF pool will not be reached until 2074 (more 
than 75 years after RSG-GAS began operation); thus, the spent fuel can 
be moved from the wet storage to a dry storage system before 2074. 
BATAN has planned to build a dry storage system for Indonesia’s spent 
fuel. Several studies have been conducted on important parameters of 
spent fuel dry storage systems, such as spent fuel characterization, 
criticality, radiation protection, and natural airflow caused by temper-
ature differences for spent fuel decay heat removal [76,79,99]. From the 
decay heat data of the RSG-GAS spent fuel (MTR with 300 g of U-235 per 
fuel element and 72% burn-up), it can be seen in Fig. 13 (semi--
logarithmic graph) that the decay heat declines exponentially. In spent 
fuel, if the decay heat declines, the radiation exposure also decreases. 
After approximately four years, the decay heat declines by 3.7 × 103 
times, and the curve starts sloping. At this time, the spent fuel can be 
moved from wet storage to dry storage. 
Other possibilities include the repatriation policy or sending spent 
fuel to other countries. However, this second scenario or strategy could 
be high-cost or not even possible, as Indonesia’s existing and “future” 
spent fuel is low-enriched-uranium spent fuel. Since 2001, Indonesia has 
had no contractual agreement for spent nuclear fuel repatriation. In 
2014, PT INUKI, a nuclear fuel fabrication company in Indonesia, faced 
a technical problem. Therefore, BATAN had discussed with Russia the 
possibility of purchasing fuel for the Serpong reactor. Among the matters 
discussed was the repatriation of the spent nuclear fuel. This option is 
available, with the consequence of significant additional costs. Howev-
er, the discussion did not continue because PT INUKI resumed operation. 
A third scenario that can also be considered is the possibility of an 
NPP or experimental NPP construction in Indonesia. In 2014, BATAN 
launched a plan to build an experimental NPP, named Reaktor Daya 
Eksperimental (RDE)/Non Komersial (RDNK) [78,100,101]. This 
experimental NPP is planned to be a research-and-development facility 
as well as the first NPP in Indonesia, with an aim to gain public accep-
tance. The spent nuclear fuel from the research reactors can be relocated 
collectively with the spent fuel from the NPP to the spent nuclear fuel 
storage of the NPP. 
6. Conclusions 
With a growing population and increasing industrialization, energy 
demands are continually increasing. However, limited fossil-source en-
ergy reserves and commitments to reduce carbon emissions are 
requiring Indonesia to consider the use of nuclear energy. The man-
agement of radioactive waste and spent fuel is a significant factor con-
trolling public acceptance. The success of the current management of 
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, as well as the preparation for 
the future, is one of the keys to the success of Indonesia’s future NPP 
program. 
Although the ISSF could be utilized theoretically for more than 75 
years with the existing reactor operations, the construction of a spare 
interim storage site might be necessary for emergency conditions or if 
the operation of the existing ISSF needs to be halted to repair any 
possible damage. The continuous maintenance, assessment, and sur-
veillance of the material, structure, and system aging, which have been 
conducted to ensure the long-term utilization safety of the facility, must 
Fig. 13. Spent fuel decay heat as a function of time.  
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be maintained and improved. Moreover, a plan to build a dry storage 
system that can serve as another spare storage site should also be 
finalized as soon as possible, to ensure that the spent fuel elements that 
have been stored for more than four years can be moved to dry storage. 
After four years, the natural decline in the decay heat and radiation 
exposure of the spent fuel will be at an acceptable level for the spent fuel 
to be moved to dry storage. 
Each of the three strategies for future nuclear spent fuel management 
in Indonesia has advantages and disadvantages. Hence, these strategies 
need to be compared with consideration of current and future condi-
tions, and the strategy that has the fewest disadvantages should be 
selected. 
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